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California Evidence Code 1228:
A Constitutional Analysis
Concern over the sexual abuse of children has increased dramatically
in recent years.' Distressed by the serious nature of this crime, legal
commentators and the public have called for more effective means
of prosecuting those accused of sexual abuse of children. 2 Accordingly,
several state legislatures have enacted statutory exceptions to tradi-
tional procedural safeguards in order to assist the prosecution in
proving the guilt of defendants in child sexual abuse cases.' The pro-
ponents of this legislation justify these exceptions by arguing that the
sexual abuse of children is a unique crime, the nature of which dic-
tates the need for special laws in order to convict the perpetrators.4
Opponents of the legislation fear that due to the present state of
hysteria about child sexual abuse, defendants are being systematically
denied their procedural due process protections.'
1. "Some Day, I'll Cry My Eyes Out," Time, April 23, 1984, at 72-73 (extent of prob-
lem is only now beginning to dawn on many authorities); see, e.g., Note, The Testimony of
Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HA~v. L. REv. 806,
806 (1985).
2. See Yun, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1766 (1983) (existing hearsay exceptions inadequate to deal with uni-
que problems associated with child sexual abuse); Wilson, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay
Exception: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J. Joy. L. 59, 73 (1984) (special hearsay exceptions
needed to stop near epidemic sexual abuse of children); Libai, The Protection of the Child
Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 1014 (1969)
(proposes special child courtrooms); see also L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, §V, at 9, col. 1 (Con-
cerned Citizens for Stronger Legislation Against Child Molesters (S.L.A.M.) seeks tougher child
molestation laws L.A. Times, April 6, 1984, §11, at 2, col. I (public support sought for tougher
California law on child molestations).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1377 (allows alleged victims of sexual abuse, who are 10 years
or younger, to testify by means of two-way closed-circuit television); WASH. C, M. CODE
§9A.44.120 (permits admission of a hearsay statement about sexual abuse by a child under
the age of ten, upon a finding by the court that the circumstances and content of the statement
indicate that the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence).
4. "A new approach is needed, one which is sensitive to the special circumstances of
child sex abuse and its victims." Yun, supra note 2, at 1766; "Because sexual abuse of children
has become epidemic or nearly so ... a special hearsay exception is needed to make admissible
what is often the only direct evidence of the act or its perpetrator's identity: the out-of-court
statements of the child victim." Wilson, supra note 2, at 73.
5. See Frank, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the
Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 387, 403-04 (1984); see also
The Other Victims of Child Abuse, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 1, 1985, at 66 (flurry
of arrests and new laws aimed at stopping child abuse misfire and end up creating a "child abuse
hysteria"); The Youngest Witnesses, Is there a "witch hunt" mentality in sex-abuse cases?,
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Prosecutors frequently have a very difficult task proving the guilt
of defendants accused of sexually abusing young children.6 There are
rarely any witnesses or corroborative physical evidence of the alleged
abuse.7 In many instances, the prosecutor's only direct evidence is
an out-of-court statement made by the child.8 Unless the child takes
the stand or the statement falls within a hearsay exception, the hear-
say rule of evidence9 bars the prosecution from introducing the out-
of-court statement of the child.'" Consequently, several state legislatures
have created special exceptions to the hearsay rule to cover this situa-
tion." These exceptions allow the prosecution to introduce, under cer-
tain circumstances, the out-of-court statements of the allegedly sex-
ually abused child.' 2
Following the trend of establishing special child hearsay exceptions,
the California legislature, in January 1985, added section 1228 to the
California Evidence Code.' 3 The bill enacting section 1228 was in-
NEWSWEEK, February 18, 1985, at 72-73 (as reports of child abuse increase, the number of
false accusations increase, ruining the reputations of many innocent people); Note, supra note
1, at 809 (current hearsay and videotaping statutes fail to meet constitutional standards). Cf.
Armstrong, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OREo. L. REV.
567 (1976) (any type of video testimony may deny the defendant the right to confrontation).
6. Yun, supra note 2, at 1745-46; Wilson, supra note 2, at 59-60; Skolar, New Hearsay
Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).
7. Yun, supra note 2, at 1745-46; Wilson, supra note 2, at 59-60; Skolar, New Hearsay
Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).
8. Wilson, supra note 2, at 73; Note, supra note 1, at 806-07; Yun, supra note 2, at 1749.
9. Hearsay is a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Cal. Evid.
Code §1200. In California, unless the hearsay falls within a statutory exception, the hearsay
is inadmissible. Id.
10. Yun, supra note 2, at 1747.
11. At least seven states have enacted child hearsay exception statutes since 1982. These
are: Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Note, supra
note 1 at 811 n.38.
12. Frank, supra note 5, at 387-88. The Washington statute provides in part:"A statement
made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed
with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible
in evidence in criminal proceedings ... if: (1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside
the presence of the jury, that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) The child either: (a) Testifies at the proceedings; or (b) Is
unavailable as a witness: Provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such state-
ment may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act." WASH. CRIM. CODE
§9A.44.120. The Washington statute has been the model for all but one of the child hearsay
statutes in the other states. Note, supra note 1, at 811. The Kansas statute differs in that
it applies only if the child victim is not available to testify at trial, and it applies to any crime
in which the victim is a child. Note, supra note 1, at 811 n.39. A California assembly bill,
34 (Mojonnier), which would have established a hearsay exception very similar to that of
Washington, failed to pass the Assembly Public Safety Committee on May 20, 1985.
13. CAL. Evm. CODE §1228 reads in full:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of establishing the elements
of the crime in order to admit as evidence the confession of a person accused of
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troduced in response to a highly publicized Solano County case in
which the defendant was charged with sexually abusing his twelve-
year-old stepdaughter. 4 The stepfather confessed to fondling his step-
daughter but the court still confined the stepdaughter to juvenile hall
for eight days for refusing to testify.' Because the stepdaughter refused
to testify, the corpus delicti of the alleged crime could not be
established, and therefore, the stepfather's confession was inadmissi-
ble.' 6 Without the confession, the prosecution's case collapsed and
the charges were ultimately dismissed. 7 Section 1228 was enacted to
avoid the same problem in similar future cases."
Section 1228 is a hearsay exception which provides that a hearsay
statement made by a child in a sexual abuse case may be used to
satisfy the corpus delicti rule' 9 in certain circumstances.2 0 Existing law
requires that the elements of a crime, "the corpus delicti," must be
established by evidence other than the defendant's confession.' Unless
violating Section 261, 264.1, 285, 286, 288, 288a, 289, or 647a of the Penal Code,
a court, in its discretion, may determine that a statement of the complaining witness
is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if it finds all of the following: (a) The
statement was made by a minor child under the age of 12, and the contents of the
statement were included in a written report of a law enforcement official or an
employee of a county welfare department. (b) The statement describes the minor child
as a victim of sexual abuse. (c) The statement was made prior to the defendant's
confession. The court shall review with caution the testimony of a person recounting
hearsay where there is evidence of personal bias or prejudice. (d) There are no cir-
cumstances, such as significant inconsistencies between the confession and the state-
ment concerning material facts establishing any element of the crime or the iden-
tification of the defendant, that would render the statement unreliable. (e) The minor
child is found to be unavailable pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Sec-
tion 240 or refuses to testify. (f) The confession was memorialized in a trustworthy
fashion by a law enforcement official. If the prosecution intends to offer a statement
of the complaining witness pursuant to this section, the prosecution shall serve a
written notice upon the defendant at least 10 days prior to the hearing or trial at
which the prosecution intends to offer the statement. If the statement is offered during
trial, the court's determination shall be made out of the presence of the jury. If
the statement is found to be admissible pursuant to this section, it shall be admitted
out of the presence of the jury and solely for the purpose of determining the ad-
missibility of the confession of the defendant.
CAL. EVID. CODE §1228 (added by Stats. 1984, c. 1421, p. -, §1.).
14. Letter of intent from Senator Barry Keene to Governor George Deukmejian (August
30, 1984) (explaining the purpose of and reasons for Evidence Code section 1228). Copy on
file at the Pacific Law Journal.
15. L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, §1, at 13, col. 4.
16. Id.
17. L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1984, §1, at 3, col. 6.
18. Letter of intent, supra note 14.
19. Corpus delicti means the body of a crime. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 181 (abridged
5th ed. 1983). The corpus delicti rule requires a showing of all elements of an alleged crime
prior to admission of the defendant's confession.
20. CAL. EVID. CODE §1228.
21. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 679-80, 504 P.2d 1256, 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792,
796 (1973).
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the corpus delicti can be established by independent evidence, a defen-
dant's confession is inadmissible. "2 The purpose of section 1228 is
to provide a mechanism by which the corpus delicti of the crime may
be established when a child sexual abuse victim is unavailable, or
refuses to testify. 3 The out-of-court statement of the child is heard
by the judge out of the presence of the jury and solely for the pur-
pose of determining the admissibility of the confession of the
defendant.
First, this comment will briefly examine the history of the corpus
delicti rule in order to establish the origin and purpose of the rule.
Next, the rationale and policy reasons for the creation of the corpus
delicti rule will be assessed to determine whether they continue to
justify the use of the rule in California. After concluding that the
corpus delicti rule is still necessary to protect defendants' rights in
California, this comment proposes that the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation may be violated by the use of a hearsay
statement under Evidence Code section 1228. Thus, the test enun-
ciated in the United States Supreme Court case of Ohio v. Roberts4
should be applied to the hearsay exception created by section 1228.
This comment will conclude that because Evidence Code section 1228
fails to meet the strict standards set forth in Roberts, section 1228
should be ruled unconstitutional. As a preliminary matter, a review
of the current state of the corpus delicti rule in California is necessary.
THE CoRPus DELICTI RULE
The corpus delicti rule requires that a prima facie showing of the
elements of the crime charged be made before a defendant's extra-
judicial statements, admissions or confession may be received in
evidence.25 Before the defendant's out-of-court statements are admissi-
ble, evidence of the crime other than those statements must be
presented.2 6 A limited exploration of the history of the corpus delicti
rule is necessary in order to analyze section 1228, because the code
section attempts to mitigate the importance of this rule.
Locating the origin of the corpus delicti rule is difficult. 7 One legal
scholar has suggested that the elements of the corpus delicti rule existed
22. Id.
23. Letter of intent, supra note 14.
24. 485 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
25. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
26. Id. at 679-80, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
27. For more in-depth discussion of the historical background of the corpus delicti rule,
see generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U.
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in Roman law. 8 Others argue that the rule was a result of the general
distrust of confessions by the English common law courts. 9 Originally
in England the defendant's confession was sufficient by itself to sup-
port a conviction.30 Following this precedent, an English court in the
seventeenth century sustained a murder conviction solely upon the
uncorroborated confession of the defendant. 3' Several years after the
defendant was executed, the supposed victim returned with a bizarre
story of having been captured and sold as a slave in Turkey. 32 Similar
shocking cases, coupled with the writings of legal scholars, led the
courts to a general distrust of confessions. 33 Currently, every jurisdic-
tion in the United States, with the exception of Massachusetts, re-
quires that extrajudicial confessions be corroborated by some indepen-
dent evidence.3"
Two main policy concerns underlie the development of the corpus
delicti rule. 3" First, a confession may be unreliable if the confession
was coerced or induced by abuse of authority. 36 Second, a confession
may be unreliable because the defendant is not telling the truth.37
PA. L. REv. 638 (1955); C. McCoRMCK, McColumcK ON EVIDENCE §147 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2070-72 (Chadbourn Rev. 1978); Ayling, Corroborating Con-
fessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 vIsCON-
SIN L. REv. 1121 (1984); Schwartz, California's Corpus Delicti Rule: The Case for Review
and Clarification, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1055 (1973).
28. 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVImENcE §217 at 279 (6th ed. 1852). For an interesting analysis
of the Greenleaf theory, see Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1058 n.14.
29. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1058 n.15; 7 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 27, §2070, at 393 n.3.
30. Note, supra note 27 at 638; Ayling, supra note 27 at 1126.
31. Perry's Case, 14 How. ST. TR. 1312, 1315 (1660). The alleged "victim" had been
kidnapped and taken as a slave in Turkey. The defendant, his servant, was questioned concern-
ing his failure to return home after being sent to locate the "victim." For some unknown
reason, the defendant confessed to murdering his master, implicating not only himself but his
brother and mother as well. The three were subsequently convicted and executed on the basis
of the "victim's" disappearance, a bloodied hat, and the defendant's confession. Id. See Note,
supra note 27 at 638-39; see also Ayling, supra note 27 at 1126; Schwartz, supra note 27 at
1060-61.
32. Note, supra note 27 at 638-39; Ayling, supra note 27 at 1126; Schwartz, supra note
27 at 1060-61.
33. Note, supra note 27 at 639-40; Ayling, supra note 27 at 1126; Schwartz, supra note
27 at 1061-65. Blackstone went so far as to describe confessions as the "weakest and most
suspicious of all testimony." 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 357.
34. Ayling, supra note 27, at 1126 n.18 (list of jurisdictions and statutes pertaining to
corpus delicti rule). The Massachusetts Supreme Court believes that the jury is competent to
evaluate the probative value of an uncorroborated confession. Id. at 1126 n.17.
35. Ayling, supra note 28 at 1122-25; Note, supra note 27 at 676; see Schwartz, supra
note 27 at 108791.
36. This concern stems not only from possible police use of "third degree" methods to
obtain a confession, but also from fear that a confession may be obtained through more subtle
types of coercion which may take place during questioning. Note, supra note 27 at 643; Ayling,
supra note 27 at 1162-76.
37. A confession may be false for several reasons. First, the defendant may be mistaken
as to the facts (e.g., accused confesses to killing a person by hitting the person on the head,
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The assumption behind the first concern is that the corpus delicti rule
functions to correct possible abusive police conduct in obtaining a
confession.38 The primary safeguard against the use of uncoerced false
confessions, on the other hand, has been the corroboration require-
ment of the corpus delicti rule.39 In contrast to the other rules excluding
confessions, which are mainly concerned with the abuse of authority,
the corroboration requirement of the corpus delicti rule directly tests
the reliability of a confession. 0 Thus the primary purpose of the cor-
pus delicti rule is to prevent "errors in conviction based upon untrue
confessions alone."' '4
CALIFORNIA LAW
In California, the corpus delicti rule operates in two ways to assure
the reliability of a confession. First, the corpus delicti rule specifies
the findings that must be made by a judge before a confession may
be admitted into evidence. 2 Second, the corpus delicti rule specifies
the findings that must be made by a jury before a conviction is
allowed. "3
when the person is not actually dead). Second, the person may be mistaken as to the law
(e.g., accused who does not understand the differences between murder and noncriminal homicide
confesses to murder). Finally, a confession may be false for purely psychological reasons. Cer-
tain psychological disorders may lead a person to confess to a crime that he has never committed.
Note, supra note 27 at 643-44. In an extensive empirical study, Ayling examines whether false
confessions occur frequently enough to justify following the ancient common law corpus delicti
rule. Ayling examines psychological, sociopsychological, and sociological causes of false con-
fessions. Ayling demonstrates that the danger of false confessions is not limited to pathological
persons. Rather, even the most "normal" person may confess falsely. Additionally, the reliability
problem includes more subtle behavior than full-blown fantastic false confessions. Subtle distor-
tions of memory and self-perception can cause an innocent suspect to make incriminating
statements unwittingly, without consciously acknowledging guilt. Similarly, a guilty person can
be led to overstate the perceived degree of guilt. Finally, perhaps the most subtle manifestation
of a false confession is the ability of an entirely innocent suspect to utter false inculpatory
statements in moments of panic or confusion. Ayling concludes by contending that the corpus
delicti rule is an insufficient safeguard against false confessions, that should be supplemented
by additional procedures. Specifically, police should make a complete audio or video recording
of the entire interrogation, defense counsel should be encouraged to secure expert witnesses
to analyze the interrogation, and the order of proof should be changed to facilitate a more
objective appraisal of the extent of corroboration. Ayling, supra note, 27 at 1203.
38. Ayling, supra note 27 at 1128; Note, supra note 27 at 643; see also Schwartz, supra
note 27, at 1089 (Schwartz recognizes prevention of police misconduct in obtaining a confes-
sion as one of the reasons given for the corpus delicti rule, but argues that this function of
the rule is now obsolete).
39. Ayling, supra note 27, at 1124.
40. Id. at 1127.
41. Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 (1941).
42. The judge must be satisfied that a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti has been
made before the confession is admitted into evidence. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d at 679,
504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
43. The second aspect of the corpus delicti rule is summarized in the current standard
jury instruction given on the corpus delicti rule: "No person may be convicted of a criminal
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When the prosecution offers an alleged confession by the defen-
dant, a preliminary question is presented for the trial judge." If the
judge determines that the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence
to constitute prima facie proof that a crime was committed, the cor-
pus delicti is established and the trial judge will permit the confes-
sion to be introduced into evidence. 41 If the judge determines that
the corpus delicti has not yet been established, the confession will
be inadmissible."1 Admission of the confession allows the jury to con-
sider the confession in determining the guilt of the defendant. In
California, however, the judge is required to instruct the jury that
they must find that the confession has been corroborated before
deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.4 7 Thus, although
the question of corroboration is resubmitted to the jury, the judge
makes an initial ruling on whether the confession will be admitted
into evidence.
If a confession is uncorroborated, the confession is excluded from
evidence, not because it is irrelevant, but because policy reasons sup-
port exclusion.48 The policy reasons for the exclusion of an uncor-
roborated confession are: (1) prevention of conviction of the inno-
cent; (2) motivation for the police to undertake a thorough investiga-
tion of the crime; and (3) prevention of overreliance on the confes-
sion by the jury in making a determination of guilt.4 9 In order to
effectuate these policies, especially the concern over the jurors' view
of confessions, the question of whether the confession has been suf-
ficiently corroborated to be admissible is best left to the determina-
tion of the judge."0
offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime independent of any confession
or admission made by him outside of this trial." California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CAL-
JIC) No. 2.72, (3d ed. 1970). Whether or not requested to do so, the trial judge must give
such an instruction to the jury in every criminal case in which the defendant's confession or
admission is introduced in evidence. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 445, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313,
321 (1972). Failure to do so constitutes error. Id. The error may not be considered prejudicial,
however, if the record contains sufficient evidence, other than the confession or admission,
to establish the corpus delicti. Id.
44. See CAL. EvID. CODE §405 (provides in part that "[w]hen the existence of a preliminary
fact is disputed . . . the court shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary
fact and shall admit or exclude the proffered evidence as required by the rule of law under
which the question arises").
45. See supra note 42.
46. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 43.
48. Ayling, supra note 27, at 1139.
49. Id. See also Note, supra note 27, at 642-49; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1087-90.
50. Ayling, supra note 27, at 1139-40; see also Note, supra note 27, at 677 (recognizing
that jury's thinking may be colored by introduction of a confession).
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In California, the corpus delicti rule became part of the body of
case law in 1867.1' The California Supreme Court held that, absent
proof of a crime other than the extrajudicial confession of the defen-
dant, a conviction could not be sustained.12 Gradual judicial refine-
ment and acceptance of the rule followed. Today, the corpus delicti
rule in California prohibits the introduction of the defendant's con-
fession unless the prosecution has presented proof of the crime in-
dependent of the confession of the accused. 3 Although modern law
does extend more protection to the defendant, the policies underlying
the corpus delicti rule necessitate the continued use of the rule.54 The
California courts have consistently held that the corpus delicti rule
is a well-established rule of law and that the continued use of the
rule is necessary to protect the rights of defendants who have con-
fessed to a crime. 5
Evidence Code section 1228 allows a judge to hear, under certain
51. People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 565 (1867).
52. Jones, 31 Cal. at 569. The trial court judge struggled with the issue of whether to
admit the defendant's confession as evidence establishing the corpus delicti of the alleged crime.
The California Supreme Court reasoned that no evidence of the crime, and therefore no proof
of the corpus delicti had been presented. Thus insufficient evidence existed for conviction. Id.
For an in-depth discussion of the intricacies of the Jones case, see Schwartz, supra note 27
at 1066 nn. 51-53. The Supreme Court later developed the corpus delicti doctrine into a test
that determines the admissibility of the defendant's extrajudicial statement. See People v.
Simonsen, 170 Cal. 345, 40 P. 440 (1895) and infra note 53.
53. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796; People
v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404, 409 (1925). While the court in Jones was concerned with the sufficiency
of the defendant's statement for conviction, the Simonsen court held that the defendant's out-
of-court statements would not be admissible at all, absent independent evidence of the corpus
delicti. Compare Jones, 31 Cal. at 569 with Simonsen, 170 Cal. at 346, 40 P. at 440. In Simonsen,
the California Supreme Court held that "[it is elementary that the corpus delicti must be
established before the extra-judicial statements and admissions of a defendant are admissible
in evidence, and can be considered as tending to establish the fact to which they relate." Peo-
ple v. Simonsen, 170 Cal. at 346, 40 P. at 440.
54. Ayling, supra note 27; Note, supra note 27.
55. A question arose as to the fate of the corpus delicti rule in California after passage
of the 1967 California Evidence Code. Section 351 of that Code states: "Except as otherwise
provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." CAL. EVID. CODE §351. The corpus
delecti rule had been based entirely on decisional law and had not yet been statutorily recognized
in California. Therefore, the sweeping language of section 351 had arguably abolished the cor-
pus delicti rule in California. Apparently, only one commentator has recognized this result.
For his analysis, see Graham, California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some ReJlections on
Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 Loy. U. OF L.A.L. REv. 279 (1971). In People
v. Starr, the Court of Appeal for the Second District held that despite Evidence Code section
351, the corpus delicti was still required to be established prior to the admission of the defen.
dant's out-of-court admissions. People v. Starr, 11 Cal. App. 3d 574, 583, 89 Cal. Rptr. 906,
912 (1970). The Starr court did not believe that "such a firmly established and fundamental
rule of the criminal lay; of years' standing was overruled by any vague and indecisive provision
in the Evidence Code." Id. Subsequently, in People v. Cantrell, the California Supreme Court
again stated that a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be
established before a defendant's extrajudicial statements, admissions or confession may be received
in evidence. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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conditions, the out-of-court statement of an allegedly sexually abused
child, solely for the purpose of establishing the elements of the crime,
in order to admit as evidence the confession of the defendant. 6 Prior
to hearing the child's out-of-court statement, the judge must find that:
(1) the statement was made by a child under the age of twelve, and
the contents were included in a written report; (2) the statement
describes the child as a victim of sexual abuse; (3) the statement was
made prior to the defendant's confession; (4) no significant incon-
sistencies exist between the confession and the statement that would
render the statement unreliable; (5) the child is unavailable to testify
pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of California Evidence
Code section 240 or because of a refusal to testify; and (6) the con-
fession was memorialized in a trustworthy fashion by a law enforce-
ment official.- 7 If the statement is found to be admissible pursuant
to the above conditions, then the judge will hear the statement out
of the presence of the jury. 8 Because section 1228 allows the pro-
secution to use the alleged victim's statement without producing the
child as a witness, serious questions are raised regarding the defen-
dant's right to confront accusing witnesses. This comment next will
examine whether use of a child's hearsay statement to establish the
corpus delicti violates the defendant's constitutional right to confron-
tation. The first step in this analysis is to determine to what Califor-
nia proceedings the right of confrontation applies.
SCOPE OF TIE CONFRONTATION REQUIREMENT
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
• . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . ... 9 In
the landmark case of Pointer v. Texas, 60 the sixth amendment was
made binding on the states.6' Although the right of confrontation
is basically a trial right,62 California courts have extended the right
to confrontation beyond the trial stages of -a criminal proceeding.63
In Herbert v. Superior Court," the Third District Court of Appeal
56. CAL. EvID. CODE §1228.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
60. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
61. Id. at 406.
62. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107
(1934).
63. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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held that the right of confrontation applies in preliminary hearings.65
The court stated further that the right to confrontation is not limited
to the trial stages of proceedings, but extends to any phase of the
proceedings at which witnesses are called for questioning. 66
Section 1228 provides for a hearing at which witnesses will testify.
67
The prosecution is allowed to bring in witnesses to recount the
statements made by the child who was allegedly sexually abused.68
The holding in Herbert would dictate that the defendant's right to
confrontation is applicable, since a witness will testify at the hearing
provided for under section 1228.
The fact that the right of confrontation applies to section 1228 hear-
ings does not necessarily mean that the confrontation clause insures
the defendant the right to cross-examine the child hearsay declarant.
The child must also be found to be a "witness against" the accused
within the meaning of the sixth amendment.69 United States Supreme
Court decisions have provided some clues for determining whether
an out-of-court declarant should be considered a witness against the
accused.7" One factor to consider is the use to which an out-of-court
statement is put.7 ' For example, in determining whether the declarant
is a "witness against" the accused, the Supreme Court has considered
the importance of the evidence to the case of the prosecution.7 1 If
the evidence offered by the out-of-court declarant makes that declarant
the principal witness71 against the defendant, the witness is more likely
to be a "witness against." Additionally, if the out-of-court statement
of the declarant is the only direct evidence74 against the accused, there
is greater likelihood that the declarant will fall within the meaning
64. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
65. Id. at 666, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
66. Id.
67. Section 1228 provides in pertinent part: "The court shall view with caution the testimony
of a person recounting hearsay where there is evidence of personal bias or prejudice." CAL.
EVID. CODE §1228(c). Inherent in this language is the fact that the prosecution will be allowed
to bring a person in front of the judge to recount the statement that the child made to that person.
68. See supra note 67.
69.. The sixth amendment provides in part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend.
vi.
70. Sbe infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
71. 4 D. LOUISELL AND C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §418 (1980) at 151.
72. Id.
73. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
74. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). The confession of the co-offender implicating
the defendant was the only direct evidence that he had fired the shotgun, and this taken with
the other circumstances surrounding the shooting, amounted to a "crucial link in the proof
of petitioner's act and of the requisite intent to murder." Id. at 419.
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of the sixth amendment. On the other hand, if the statement of the
declarant is neither crucial nor devastating to the defense, then the
declarant will probably not be considered a "witness against" the
accused."
A second factor to consider in determining whether the declarant
should be considered a "witness against" is the potency or persuasive
force of the out-of-court statement.76 The greater the possibility that
a statement will influence the trier of fact, the greater the need to
view the declarant as a "witness against" the defendant." Taking
the factors discussed above into consideration, the effect of admitting
a hearsay statement of a child for the purpose of establishing the
corpus delicti will be examined.
Ti CmID As A WITNESS AGAINST
In any case in which the prosecution must use the hearsay state-
ment of the child to establish the corpus delicti, the child is probably
not just the principal witness but the only witness against the accused."
Sexual abuse crimes against children generally lack any witnesses other
than the victim and the perpetrator." Although the statement of the
child will never be heard by the trier of fact, the statement will be
used to establish the admissibility of what is in most cases the only
direct evidence against the accused, namely, the confession of the ac-
cused. Thus, the use of hearsay evidence is without doubt a crucial
link in the prosecutor's case. Without the child's hearsay statement
to establish the corpus delicti, the defendant's confession will most
likely not be admitted.80 If the confession of the defendant is not
admitted, then the case of the prosecution will probably collapse."
This result may not occur in all child sexual abuse cases. If, however,
the evidence of the prosecutor other than the child's statement is not
75. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). "This case does not involve evidence in any
sense 'crucial' or 'devastating' . . . . ... Id. at 87. The Court emphasized that the statement
of the most important state witness "was of peripheral significance at most." Id.
76. D. LOUISELL AND C. MUELLER, supra note 71, at 153.
77. See D. LOUISELL AND C. MUELLER, supra note 71, at 153.
78. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. This was the situation in a Solano County case. The young girl would not testify and
therefore the stepfather's confession was inadmissible. L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, §1, at 13,
col. 4. Of course, if the prosecution can produce enough corroborative evidence of the crime
to make a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti of the crime, the defendant's confession
would be admissible even without the testimony of the child.
81. This was the problem confronted by the prosecution in the Solano County case, which
resulted in dismissal of the charges. L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1984, §1, at 3, col. 6.
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enough to establish a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti, the
prosecutor is unlikely to have sufficient evidence to prove the guilt
of the defendant without the confession. Finally, although the hear-
say statement of the child will not be heard by the jury, the introduc-
tion of the confession, resulting from use of the statement, will have
a tremendous impact and persuasive effect upon the trier of fact.
Although cautionary instructions are required, consideration of a con-
fession by a jury has a substantial impact upon the jury's determina-
tion of the guilt or innocence of the accused."2
The crucial nature of the child's hearsay statement under section
1228 dictates that the child should be considered a "witness against"
the defendant. Therefore, the right to confrontation should apply to
the hearing provided in section 1228. The next step in this comment
will be an exploration of whether the hearsay exception created by
section 1228 violates a defendant's right to confrontation.
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Resolving the relationship between the sixth amendment and the
hearsay doctrine is a perplexing task.83 If the language of the sixth
amendment were taken literally, the confrontation clause would appear
to require the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not
present at trial.84 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
rejected a complete bar as unintended and too extreme.8 The Court
did acknowledge, however, that the confrontation clause was intended
to exclude some hearsay. 86
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.87 In California, Evidence Code section 1200
states the hearsay rule.88 The hearsay rule defines hearsay evidence
and provides that such evidence is inadmissible unless the evidence
82. See Note, supra note 27, at 677; see Ayling, supra note 27, at 1139.
83. Attempts to define and explain the relationship between the sixth amendment and the
hearsay rule has fostered volumes of scholarly writing. See generally Seidelson, Hearsay Excep-
lions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REvy. 76 (1971); Westen, The Future of
Confrontation, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1185 (1979); Graham, The Right to Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CPaJ. L. BULL. 99 (1972); Baker,
The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules and Due Process-A Proposal For Determining
When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529.
84. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. CAL. EviD. CODE §1200.
88. Id.
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meets the conditions of an exception established by law. 9 The under-
lying reason for the hearsay rule is the assumption that the testimony
of a witness relating to an out-of-court statement made by one other
than the witness is less reliable than the first hand testimony of a
person. 9"
The United States Supreme Court bases the preference for face-to-
face firsthand testimony on an interpretation of the confrontation
clause. The Court has held that the confrontation clause requires an
opportunity for the accused to be present and cross-examine the
witnesses who are testifying.9' Cross-examination gives the jury the
chance to observe the demeanor of witnesses, under oath, and sub-
ject to challenge by the defense.92 Although the Supreme Court has
demonstrated a preference for live, cross-examined testimony, the Court
recognizes exceptions to the hearsay rule.93 These exceptions are based
upon the belief that certain out-of-court statements are likely to be
extremely reliable.
The Supreme Court has developed some general guidelines to assist
courts in determining whether the admission of a hearsay statement
violates the confrontation clause. 94 When the declarant actually testifies
at trial, the Court has consistently found hearsay evidence admissi-
ble, reasoning that the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant con-
cerning the content of the out-of-court statement sufficiently tests the
reliability of the statement.95
A different situation is presented, however, when the out-of-court
declarant will not testify in court. In Ohio v. Roberts,96 the United
States Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test to determine the boun-
daries of admissible hearsay when the declarant is not present for
89. Id.
90. 4 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE 800-09 (1982). The presence
of a witness in court under oath solemnifies the occasion; the jury can observe the witness
and the defendant can cross-examine. The three together result in an expectation that the witness
will tell the truth. Without these three conditions present, testimony may be unreliable "because
faults in perception, memory, and narration of the declarant will not be exposed." Id. at 800-11.
See People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 989, 479 P.2d 998, 1003, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1971).
91. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64.
92. Id.
93. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 29899 (1973); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62.
94. The common law hearsay exceptions are merely rules of evidence; they do not mark
the boundary of the confrontation clause. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82, 86 (1970).
The Supreme Court has both upheld the admission of hearsay evidence not embraced by tradi-
tional exceptions, and held unconstitutional the admission of hearsay falling within arguably
recognized exceptions. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-65 (1970).
95. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 301; Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-27
(1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158-61.
96. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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cross-examination at trial. 97 First, the prosecution must demonstrate
that the declarant is unavailable after a "good faith" effort has been
made to produce the declarant.98 Second, the hearsay evidence must
have sufficient "indicia of reliability." 99 Reliability can be established
by showing either that the evidence falls within a firmly-rooted'00 hear-
say exception, or by demonstrating that the hearsay bears particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.' 0
Evidence Code section 1228 is an exception to the hearsay rule which
allows a judge to hear the statement of a child when the child will
not be present to testify at trial.'02 The child's statement will be con-
veyed to the judge through the testimony of a third party, 03 thus
eliminating the opportunity for the defense to cross-examine the child
declarant. Therefore, the two-part test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts
should be applied to section 1228 to assess whether this hearsay
exception denies the defendant's right to confront the witness against
him.
THE UNAVALABLE DECLARANT REQUIREMENT
The requirement of unavailability expressed in Roberts reflects a
balancing of competing interests. The Court strives to ensure that the
accused will have the opportunity to confront the declarant in court
whenever possible.'0 In some circumstances when the declarant is
unavailable to testify, however, the prosecution may be allowed to
use the out-of-court statement of the declarant.'0 5 In this case, the
state bears the burden of demonstrating the unavailability of the
declarant whose out-of-court statement is in issue.' 06
97. Id. at 65-66.
98. Id. at 66.
99. Id.
100. Id. Whether "firm rooting" is a function of either the longevity of an exception, the
number of jurisdictions recognizing the exception, or both, is uncertain. The statements of
children have been admitted into court using a variety of established hearsay exceptions. See
Yun, supra note 2 at 1753-63; Skolar, supra note 6 at 7. The most widely used exception
has been the excited utterance or res gestae exception. Yun, supra note 2, at 1753.
101. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
102. CAL. Evm). CODE §1228.
103. Id.
104. See Ohio v. Roberts, 484 U.S. at 65. "The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavail-
ability is established: '[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of . . .the exception to
the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith ef-
fort to obtain his presence at trial."' Id. at 74, citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
105. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
106. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75. In California, the burden of proof of unavailability is
on the proponent of the evidence. People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal. 3d 221, 236, 561 P.2d 261,
270, 137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 180 (1977).
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One of the preconditions to the admissibility of the child's hearsay
statement under Evidence Code section 1228 is that the child be found
unavailable. The child must be found unavailable either pursuant to
paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 240, or
because of a refusal to testify." 7 Evidence Code section 1228 is unclear
with respect to what is needed in order for a child's refusal to testify
to establish unavailability. The wording of the statute indicates that
mere refusal by the child to testify is sufficient to render the child
unavailable.' 8 This comment will propose that under current California
case law, a recalcitrant witness may be found unavailable only upon
(1) expert corroboration that the witness refuses to testify out of
justifiable fear, or (2) a showing that the witness persists in refusing
to testify even after the court has imposed coercive sanctions against
the witness.
Prior to enactment of section 1228, California statutory law had
not recognized mere refusal to testify as a ground constituting
unavailability.0 9 California case law, however, has recognized refusal
to testify as sufficient to deem the witness unavailable in two cir-
cumstances. The first is when fear of testifying by the witness con-
stitutes a mental infirmity within the meaning of paragraph (3) of
subdivision (a) of California Evidence Code section 240.110 The recogni-
tion of the fear of testifying by a witness as a basis for unavailability
under Evidence Code section 240 was established by the California
Supreme Court in the landmark case of People v. Rojas."'
Prior to the Rojas decision, the law was unclear whether the refusal
by a witness to testify would fall within the bounds of section 240
so as to render the witness "unavailable."" ' 2 In Rojas, the defen-
dants were convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in two counts."13
Navarette, an essential prosecution witness, was a co-passenger in the
automobile driven by defendant Rojas. 1 4 Navarette testified at the
107. CAL. Evw. CODE §1228(e). Under paragraph 3 subdivision (a) a witness is unavailable
if dead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity. CAL. Evm. CODE §240.
108. CAL. EvIm. CODE §1228 subsection (e) states, "The minor child is found to be unavailable
pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 240 or refuses to testify." Id.
109. See CAL. Evm. CODE §240 (refusal to testify not listed as one of the factors establishing
the unavailability of a witness.) See also People v. Rojas, 15 Cal. 3d 540, 550, 542 P.2d 229,
235, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 (1975) (court noting that California Evidence Code §240 does
not mention a refusal to testify as grounds for unavailability). Id.
110. People v. Rojas, 15 Cal. 3d at 550, 542 P.2d at 235, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
111. Id.
112. Uhl, People v. Rojas: The Expanding Concept of Unavailability, 3 PEPPERDINE L.
Rv. 394, 398 (1976).
113. Id.
114. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17
preliminary hearing and at the first trial of the defendants.' The
jury was unable to render a verdict, and a second trial was set. ' 16
At the second trial, Navarette refused to testify."I7 Navarette declared
that he had been subjected to threats of bodily harm, and that his
family had suffered from the vandalism of their property." 8 Navarette
further stated that he feared greatly for the safety of his family, and
therefore, intimidated by the possibility of future danger, Navarette
felt compelled to refuse to testify." 9 Despite being threatened with
contempt, Navarette remained silent; he was thereafter incarcerated. 2 0
The trial court allowed the prior testimony of Navarette to be read
at the second trial, stating that Navarette's refusal to testify rendered
him unavailable under section 240 of the Evidence Code. 2' Rojas
was subsequently convicted; Rojas then appealed his conviction to
the California Supreme Court. 22 The Court affirmed the conviction
of Rojas, ruling that Navarette's fear for safety constituted a mental
infirmity within the meaning of section 240(a)(3). 23 Therefore, the
Court held, Navarette was properly characterized as unavailable, and
thus his prior testimony could be admitted. 24
In determining whether the fear of testifying by a witness constitutes
a sufficient basis for unavailability under Evidence Code section 240,
the California Supreme Court has held that either expert testimony
on the sufficiency of the witness' fear, or the witness' own express
refusal to testify made at trial, is needed.'25 In the case of People
v. Stritzinger26 the California Supreme Court was faced with an
allegedly sexually abused child who refused to testify at trial. The
trial court had held that the mother's testimony on the issue of her
daughter's mental health was legally sufficient to support a finding
of unavailability.'27 The trial court therefore allowed the preliminary
hearing testimony of the child to be admitted into evidence at trial. 28
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Uhl, supra note 112, at 399.
122. Id.
123. Uhl, supra note 112, at 400.
124. Id.
125. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 516-17, 668 P.2d 738, 746, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431,
439 (1983).
126. 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
127. Id. at 510, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
128. Id.
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The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision, stating
that the mother's testimony was insufficient to establish that the child's
fear constituted a mental infirmity within the meaning of section 240.129
Stritzinger distinguished People v. Rojas3 ' by noting that in Rojas
the witness who had testified at the preliminary hearing appeared at
the trial and stated he would refuse to testify out of fear.' 3 ' The trial
court was therefore able to observe the demeanor of the witness to
determine whether his fear amounted to a mental infirmity that would
render testimony relatively impossible.' The young witness in Stritz-
inger, however, did not testify at trial. '3 Thus, if under Evidence
Code section 1228 the refusal of the child to testify is motivated by
fear, the court must either have expert corroboration or have the child's
testimony at trial in order to determine whether the fear is sufficient
to constitute a mental infirmity within the meaning of paragraph (3)
of subsection (a) of Evidence Code 240.
The second circumstance in which a recalcitrant witness may be
deemed unavailable under California law is when the witness persists
in refusing to testify after the court has used coercive measures to
secure testimony.'34 In People v. Sul,' the California Court of Appeal
for the Fifth District was confronted with the question of whether
to uphold the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness
who had subsequently refused to testify at trial. The court in Sul
distinguished Rojas, noting that nothing in the record indicated that
the witness' refusal to testify was motivated by fear.' 36 The trial court
had heard no evidence of threats of violence against the witness.' 37
The Sul court decided to adopt a standard for unavailability that
had been enunciated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 38 That
standard permits the court to make a finding of unavailability only
after reasonable steps have been taken to induce the witness to testify,
unless such steps would be unavailing.1 39 The Sul court stated that
"[s]uch action is required, else the defendant is denied his Sixth
129. Id. at 516, 668 P.2d at 746, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
130. 15 Cal. 3d 540, 542 P.2d 229, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1975).
131. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d at 519, 668 P.2d at 748, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. People v. Sul, 122 Cal. App. 3d 355, 365, 175 Cal. Rptr. 893, 899 (1981).
135. 122 Cal. App. 3d 355, 175 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1981).
136. Id. at 363, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
137. Id.
138. Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903, cert. denied 400 U.S. 993, (1969). Sul, 122
Cal. App. 3d at 365, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
139. Sul, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 365, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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Amendment right to confrontation."' 14 The court concluded that the
efforts of the trial court in attempting to obtain the testimony of
the witness (finding him in contempt and sending him to jail) were
insufficient in view of the importance of the sixth amendment right
of confrontation.' 4 ' The court felt that the trial court had failed to
make adequate use of other resources available to secure the testimony
of the recalcitrant witness before deeming the witness unavailable.' 42
Therefore, if under Evidence Code section 1228 a court is confronted
with a recalcitrant child whose refusal to testify is not motivated by
fear, the court must take coercive steps, in accordance with Sul, in
an attempt to obtain the testimony of the child. A finding of
unavailability should be made only if the child persists in refusing
to testify despite efforts of the court to induce the testimony. This
result is mandated by the Sul court's interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation.
Once the prosecution demonstrates the witness is unavailable, Roberts
dictates that the hearsay evidence must bear sufficient indicia of
reliability. 43 The prosecution can demonstrate reliability by showing
either that the evidence falls within a "firmly-rooted" hearsay excep-
tion or that the evidence bears "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." The second part of the Roberts test will now be applied
to Evidence Code section 1228 to determine whether this new excep-
tion to the hearsay rule provides adequate safeguards to ensure the
reliability of the child's statement.
Ti-E REQUIREMENT OF PARTICULARIZED GUARANTEES OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS
The second part of the Roberts test requires a showing that the
out-of-court statement of the hearsay declarant possesses adequate "in-
dicia of reliability."' 44 Even if the presence of the declarant is excused,
the hearsay offered by the state may violate the confrontation clause,
absent a showing that the tendered evidence has sufficient "indicia
of reliability." The Roberts case specifically noted that reliability can
be assumed when the statement comes within a firmly-rooted excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.' 5 If the statement does not fall within a
140. Id.
141. Id. at 367, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
142. Id.
143. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
144. Id. at 65-66.
145. Id.
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firmly rooted hearsay exception, the statement must be excluded unless
the state can demonstrate that the statement bears "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." '4 6
The language of the Washington statute,' 7 which has been the model
for statutes establishing child hearsay exceptions in other states,
4
1
reflects an obvious awareness and attentiveness to the test established
in Roberts.19 With one exception, all child hearsay statutes require
a showing of unavailability if the child is not going to testify at trial. 5 '
Additionally, all but one of the statutes require corroboration of the
alleged sexual abuse crime when the child will not testify at trial.' 5 '
The corroboration requirement is an apparent attempt by the states
to satisfy the Roberts requirement of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."' 52 However, none of the statutes defines what con-
stitutes corroboration sufficient to allow the hearsay statement of an
absent declarant in evidence.' 53
Some proponents of child hearsay exceptions argue that because
children do not lie about sexual abuse, their statements are inherent-
ly trustworthy and therefore would satisfy the reliability aspect of
the Roberts test.'54 Whether children lie about sexual abuse is a con-
tinuing controversy,' 55 and the issue will not be solved by this com-
146. Id.
147. See supra note 12.
148. Note, supra note 1 at 811. Only the Kansas statute differs substantially from the
Washington statute set forth supra note 12. The Kansas statute is not limited to cases of sexual
abuse, but applies to any crime in which the victim is a child. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-460
(dd) (1983). supra note I at 811 n.39.
149. The Washington statute requires that when the child will not testify at trial, the child
must be found unavailable and corroborative evidence of the act must be presented by the
state, prior to admission of the out-of-court declarant. WASH. CRIM. CODE §9A.44.120.
150. Note, supra note 1 at 811. The only state that does not require a showing of unavail-
ability is Utah. See id. at 812. See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-411 (Supp. 1983).
151. Note, supra note I at 812. The only state that does not require a showing of cor-
roboration when a child will not be available to testify is Kansas. See id. at 812. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. §60-460 (dd) (1983).
152. Note, supra note I at 812; see, Frank, supra note 5 at 402; Peterson, Sexual Abuse
of Children-Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REv. 813, 826-28 (1983);
Yun, supra note 2 at 1763-66; Wilson, supra note 2 at 71-73.
153. Note, supra note 1 at 819.
154. See Skolar, supra note 6 at 43-46 (arguing that a brief review of relevant psychological
literature suggests that a child's out of court statements of sexual abuse are inherently reliable);
Wilson, supra note 2 at 67-73 (arguing that a child's statement is especially trustworthy because
this type of sexual activity is beyond the realm of the child's experience).
155. Two experts on child sex abuse claim that "there is little or no evidence indicting
that children's reports are unreliable, and none at all to support the fear that children often
make false accusations of sexual assault or misunderstand innocent behavior by adults." Berlinger
and Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. Issue, No.
2, 125, 127 (1984). One study of sex abuse cases found that roughly 95 percent of children's
accusations were accurate. See Would a Kid Lie?, A.B.A.J. Feb. 1985, 17. Another paper,
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ment. The existence of a controversy, however, raises questions about
the inherent reliability of a child's statement about sexual abuse. If
states were to base their child hearsay exceptions upon the theory
that children do not lie about sexual abuse, then a separate require-
ment of corroboration would be superfluous.'5 6 This reasoning would
place the defendant in the hopeless position of having to refute, absent
the benefit of cross-examination, the out-of-court statement of a child
whose charge is only supported by a controversial theory that a child
would not lie about such an occurrence.
Experience has demonstrated, however, that children do lie, at least
in some instances, about sexual abuse. " The better approach,
therefore, is to require some corroboration that sexual abuse did occur,
prior to admitting the statement of a child declarant who will not
be available for cross-examination. Since the bulk of the prosecution's
case will typically be based upon the child's hearsay statement, 8 a
requirement of independent corroboration is necessary to diminish the
chances that an innocent defendant will be convicted.
Exactly what constitutes adequate corroboration prior to the
admission of the child's statement is a difficult standard to construct.' 9
based upon clinical work and the study of over 120 cases of child sexual abuse concludes that
children almost never make up stories about sexual abuse. See Is The Child Victim of Sexual
Abuse Telling The Truth?, 8 CHmD ABUSE & NEGLECT, 473-81 (1984). But see, The Other
Victims of Child Abuse, U.S. NEws & WoaLD REPoRT, April 1, 66 (1985) (Young children
do make up false charges concerning sexual abuse for several reasons. Children may simply
invent stories, others falsify on purpose to get revenge against a parent or teacher who disciplines
them, and some erroneous accusations are inspired by the parents themselves to assist them
in divorce or custody proceedings); The Youngest Witnesses, Is there a "witch hunt" mentality
in sex-abuse cases? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1985 at 72-73, (children are extremely susceptible to
suggestion which may lead them to make false claims based upon the unfounded suggestions
of an investigator); Wilson v. United States, 271 F.2d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (citing M.
GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHATRY AND THE LAW 374 (1952), for the proposition that
children have no real understanding of the serious consequences of the charges they make);
People v. Scholl, 225 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563, 37 Cal. Rptr. 475, 478 (1964) (stating that children
may act out of malice or be the victims of sexual fantasies).
156. See Note, supra note 1, at 820.
157. See supra note 155.
158. See Yun, supra note 2, at 1749 (child's statements often constitute the only proof
of the crime); see Wilson, supra note 2, at 73 (hearsay statement is often the only direct evidence
of the act); see Note, supra note 1, at 806-07 (child is usually the only witness to the crime).
159. The vague language of the Roberts decision provides little assistance in constructing
criteria to determine whether the statement of an absent declarant bears sufficient "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." States therefore have struggled to determine what type or amount
of corroboration is sufficient in order to admit the hearsay statement of a child who is unavailable
to testify. The underlying policy for the limitations on admissible hearsay, however, emerges
clearly from the Roberts decision. "Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in
the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence,
the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material
departure from the reason of the general rule."' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107).
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Because the existing child hearsay exceptions do not list specific cor-
roborative findings that must be made, the trial judge is left with
broad discretion in determining the admissibility of the child's hear-
say statement. Absence of some objective standards will certainly lead
to endless appeals claiming that the state has failed to demonstrate
that the child's statement bears "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness."
A better approach would be to avoid the problems of giving a trial
judge complete discretion, by defining the standards for sufficient cor-
roboration through legislative action or judicial decision.' 0 Several
suggestions have been made as to what standards would be appropriate.
The statement must produce corroborative evidence of the actual sexual
abuse, and not merely of the circumstances surrounding the act
described by the child. 6 ' To corroborate the alleged sexual abuse,
the state would be allowed to offer eyewitness testimony, physical
evidence, or any clear evidence that the child has been the victim
of sexual abuse, including psychiatric testimony that the child displays
behavioral symptoms of having been sexually abused. 62
Although these suggestions are meant to apply to situations in which
the hearsay statement of the child is to be presented to the jury, 63
the same rationale and concerns are applicable to Evidence Code sec-
tion 1228. Even though the statement of the child will not be heard
by the jury, the statement will be used to secure the admittance of
the prosecution's most crucial evidence, namely, the defendant's con-
fession. In order to prevent conviction of a defendant based almost
entirely upon the hearsay statement of a child, the requirement of some
form of corroboration is necessary.
Section 1228 fails to require any form of corroboration of the alleged
sexual abuse prior to admission of the child's hearsay statement to
the judge. Section 1228 allows the uncorroborated hearsay statement
alone to satisfy the corpus delicti requirement. This comment con-
tends that because the reliability of a child's hearsay statement charging
sexual abuse is questionable, the statement standing alone is insuffi-
cient to satisfy the reliability prong of the Roberts test for the con-
stitutional use of hearsay statements. Therefore, section 1228 should
be ruled unconstitutional unless rewritten to require independent cor-
160. Note, supra note 1, at 821.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Note, supra note 1 (analysis of child hearsay exceptions of other states which provide
for the introduction of the hearsay statement to the jury).
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roboration of the child's hearsay statement prior to the admission
of the statement. A showing of corroboration is necessary to satisfy
the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required by Roberts.
CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse of children is a crime with serious social consequences.
In understandable zeal to effectively deal with the problem of sexual
abuse of children, several states have passed child hearsay exceptions.
The California legislature added section 1228 to the Evidence Code
in January 1985. Section 1228 is a limited child hearsay exception
that allows use of the out-of-court statement of a child to establish
the corpus delicti in child sexual abuse cases for the purpose of
admitting the defendant's confession into evidence.
In Herbert v. Superior Court, the California Third District Court
of Appeal held that the right of confrontation is not limited to the
trial stage of criminal proceedings, but extends to any phase in which
witnesses are called for questioning. Therefore, the right to confron-
tation should apply to the hearing provided for by section 1228, at
which witnesses will recount the statement of the child in order to
establish the corpus delicti.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the United States Supreme Court held that
the confrontation clause limits the extent of admissible hearsay. The
Court enunciated a two-part test: first, the prosecution must
demonstrate that the witness is unavailable; and second, if the evidence
does not fall within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, the evidence
must be excluded, absent a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Section 1228 fails to meet the requirements
established in Roberts. The language of section 1228 appears to
authorize a finding of unavailability when a child merely refuses to
testify. California, however, has interpreted the unavailability doc-
trine as requiring the court to take coercive steps to elicit the testimony
of the recalcitrant witness prior to a finding of unavailability. Addi-
tionally, section 1228 does not require that independent corrobora-
tion of the child's statement be presented prior to the admission of
the statement. Corroborative evidence of the alleged sexual abuse must
be presented prior to the admission of the statement in order to satisfy
the showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" man-
dated by the Roberts decision. Therefore, because the hearsay exception
created by section 1228 does not fulfill the Roberts criteria, admis-
sion of a child's hearsay statement pursuant to Evidence Code sec-
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tion 1228 would deny the defendant the right to confront the witness
against him.
The implementation of the child hearsay exception in Evidence Code
section 1228 may result in more convictions, but the use of critical
hearsay statements not subject to full cross-examination would also
greatly increase the risk of convicting innocent people. In view of
the current wave of hysteria surrounding the crime of sexual abuse
of children, steps must be taken to insure the accused is provided
a fair and impartial trial, rather than searching for ways to obtain
more convictions in order to appease the anger of society.
Patrick Michael Broderick
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